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Alejandro Rodriguez came to the United States from Mexico in
September 1979 when he was one year old.' Having been in the
country his entire life, Mr. Rodriguez has since acquired lawful
permanent resident status, demonstrated extensive family ties with
United States citizen relatives, and documented work as a dental
assistant .
Detention Day 1: On April 15, 2004, after having completed
sentences for a theft and drug offense, Mr. Rodriguez was arrested by
the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") and charged with
deportability.3
Detention Day 98: On July 21, 2004, an immigration judge
ordered him removed to Mexico.' Mr. Rodriguez appealed to the
Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA").
5
Detention Day 251: The BIA affirmed Mr. Rodriguez's removal
order.6 As a last resort, Mr. Rodriguez filed a petition for review
* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.
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Esq. for his guidance on this Note, and for introducing me to the law five years ago. I am
also grateful to the editors of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for their hard
work throughout the editing process. Finally, I dedicate this Note to my parents, my
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before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and
requested a stay of removal.' That request was granted.8 Despite the
government's opposition, the Ninth Circuit found that Mr. Rodriguez
presented substantial legal claims.9
Detention Day 456: The Ninth Circuit granted the government's
motion to stay the case." In 2005, while Mr. Rodriguez's case was
pending, the Ninth Circuit decided Penuliar v. Ashcroft." The Ninth
Circuit's decision in Penuliar was favorable to Mr. Rodriguez's case
because it meant that his conviction was not a deportable offense.1
His removal proceedings probably should have ended at this time.
However, the government again moved to stay Mr. Rodriguez's case
pending potential rehearing proceedings in Penuliar.13
Detention Day 850: The Ninth Circuit granted another motion to
stay the case pending the government's petition for certiorari in
Penuliar'
Detention Day 1070: In March 2007, the Supreme Court decided
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez.5  While that decision essentially
reversed Penuliar, the Supreme Court explicitly left open some
theories under which Mr. Rodriguez could continue to defend his
case.16 Thus, when the government moved to dismiss his petition for
review, Mr. Rodriguez pursued his appeal under the theories left
open in Gonzales.
17
Detention Day 1166: In June 2007, shortly after Mr. Rodriguez
moved for class certification, the government released Mr. Rodriguez
and placed him under house arrest.'
As the above chronology shows, Mr. Rodriguez was incarcerated
for a total of three years and two months while his removal
proceedings pended. Mr. Rodriguez was not a dangerous criminal.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 8-9.
8. Id. at 9.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Penuliar v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2005).
12. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 1, at 9.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007).
16. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 1, at 10.
17. Id.
18. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 08-56156).
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His criminal history consists of a 1998 conviction for Unlawful
Driving or Taking of a Vehicle, for which he was sentenced to two
years, and a 2003 conviction for Possession of a Controlled Substance
for which he only received probation.9 Nevertheless, Mr. Rodriguez
was detained for a long period of time because the law concerning his
case was unsettled. The government was relentless in trying to deport
him all the while keeping him incarcerated. At no point during this
entire time was Mr. Rodriguez given a bond hearing to determine the
need for his prolonged detention."
Mr. Rodriguez's story is not much different from thousands of
other detainees. A 2009 report by the American Civil Liberties
Union stated that Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE")
detained at least 4,170 individuals for 180 days or longer, with 1,334
individuals detained for over a year.' In fact, a number of these
aliens were detained for more than five years."
"The government's policy of prolonged mandatory detention
imposes enormous costs on detainees, their families, and the general
public."23 Many aliens are unnecessarily detained even if they pose no
danger or flight risk 4 They can also remain detained even if they
have valid grounds to challenge their removal.25 The families of
detainees suffer both financially and emotionally, and most are forced
to seek public assistance.6 Other adverse effects of the policy are the
high government costs associated with detaining hundreds or
thousands of aliens, and the increasing number of habeas petitions
filed in district courts.
This is not to say that the government provides no relief from
prolonged detention. Relief from prolonged immigration detention is
obtained through the filing of habeas petitions.2  Through this
19. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 1, at 7.
20. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 18, at 4.
21. Issue Brief- Prolonged Immigration Detention of Individuals Who Are




23. Brief for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union Foundation at 5, Diop v.





28. See generally In re Indefinite Det. Cases, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
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framework, courts have granted immediate release, or in the
alternative, bond hearings, to aliens whose detentions have become
unreasonable.29 However, some courts have declined to extend such
relief notwithstanding years of detention.3°
The Ninth Circuit recently imposed a bright-line rule in
Rodriguez v. Robbins3' that triggers the requirement for bond
hearings when detention has exceeded six months.32 The Rodriguez
decision marks a bold step by the Ninth Circuit-one that other
circuits and the United States Supreme Court might have to
ultimately accept or reject.
This Note seeks to analyze whether the rule established in
Rodriguez-that aliens who have been detained for more than six
months automatically receive a bond hearing-is necessary to
safeguard the due process rights of detained non-citizens, and
whether such rule is practicable in light of other considerations. Part
I provides a historical background on the laws surrounding
immigration detention. Part II examines the Ninth Circuit's ruling in
Rodriguez. Part III compares the two approaches that have emerged
in defining the limits of "reasonable" detention-the Ninth Circuit's
six-month rule and the Third and Sixth Circuits' case-by-case
approach. Finally, Part IV suggests that a combination of the two
approaches best balances the interests of both the government and
the detainees in light of due process considerations and other factors.
I. Historical Background on Immigration Detention
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution declares
that "no person shall .. . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law., 33  The protections and obligations
secured by the Fifth Amendment have long been extended to aliens
29. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Watkins No. B:10-126, 2010 WL 6269226 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 3,
2010) (petitioner who had been detained for eighteen months was granted judicial review
of his continued detention); Casas-Castrillon v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942 (9th
Cir. 2009) (petitioner who had been detained for nearly seven years was entitled to a bond
hearing).
30. See e.g., Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538 (5th Cir. 2006) (alien's three-year
detention pending the outcome of his removal proceedings did not violate his due process
rights); Hussain v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2007) (petitioner who had been
detained for two years was not entitled to relief from detention pending judicial review of
removal order).
31. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2013).
32. Id. at 1132-33.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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within the country's borders.4 As such, aliens are entitled to due
process rights in deportation proceedings.35 This Note is concerned
with a specific aspect of due process-the right to a bond hearing in
immigration detention.
The United States Supreme Court has abolished civil
commitment schemes that it deems to be in violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution.6 Emphasizing the importance of
"strict procedural safeguards"37 in prolonged civil detention, the
Court has required individualized assessments and hearings before a
judge to justify the continued detention of an individual.38 As a form
of civil detention, immigration detention requires the same
procedural safeguards when detention is prolonged.39
Data suggests that aliens held in mandatory detention who
contest their cases "commonly spend months, and sometimes over a
year, in detention because of enormous immigration court
backlogs."'  As stated earlier, ICE detains over a thousand aliens for
one year or longer, and some aliens can remain detained for more
than five years." Further, most of these aliens are denied bond
34. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) ("[I]t is not competent for the
Secretary of the Treasury or any executive officer, at any time within the year limited by
the statute, arbitrarily to cause an alien who has entered the country, and has become
subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although alleged to be
illegally here, to be taken into custody and deported without giving him all opportunity to
be heard upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United States.");
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) ("all persons within the territory of
the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by [the Fifth and Sixth]
amendments, and that even aliens shall not be held to answer for a capital or other
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.").
35. See generally United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317 (1987).
36. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (finding that a Louisiana statute that
allowed continued confinement of insanity acquittee even after the hospital recommended
a conditional discharge, violated due process); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979).
37. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368 (1997).
38. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 315-16 (1993).
39. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001).
40. Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed
Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 63, 81 (2012).
41. Issue Brief- Prolonged Immigration Detention of Individuals Who Are
Challenging Removal, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (July 2009), available at
https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/issue-brief-prolonged-immigration-detention-indiv
iduals-who-are-challenging-remova.
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hearings where they can ask an immigration judge to determine
whether their continued incarceration remains justified."
There are several immigration statutes that govern the detention
of aliens. In a series of decisions since 2001, the Supreme Court has
"grappled in piece-meal fashion" with interpreting these statutes in
an effort to provide guidance to the lower courts.43
"The first broad category of detainable aliens includes those
deemed inadmissible at arrival."'  8 U.S.C. section 1225(b) subjects
aliens seeking admission at the border to mandatory detention
pending removal proceedings unless they are "clearly and beyond a
doubt entitled to be admitted."5 While most aliens detained under
section 1225(b) are asylum seekers and criminal aliens, this subclass
also includes certain lawful permanent residents arriving at a United
States border.46
"The second broad category involves aliens awaiting removal
proceedings.4 7 Section 1226(a) generally authorizes the detention of
an alien pending a decision on whether he is to be removed.48
Detention under this statute is discretionary and aliens are entitled to
bond hearings.49 In contrast to section 1226(a), section 1226(c)
authorizes mandatory pre-removal detention without bond of aliens
convicted of certain crimes."
"The third category involves noncitizens for whom a final
removal (i.e., deportation) order has issued but who have not yet
been deported."5 Section 1231(a)(1) authorizes mandatory detention
during a ninety-day removal period.2 Those noncitizens who are not
42. Id.
43. Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105,1114 (9th Cir. 2010).
44. Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and
Practice, 2 HARv. NAT'L SEC. J. 85, 141 (2011).
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2012) ("[I]f the examining immigration officer determines
that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,
the alien shall be detained for a proceeding.").
46. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2012).
47. Klein & Wittes, supra note 44, at 142.
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012) ("On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an
alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be
removed from the United States"). The Ninth Circuit added to the 1226(a) subclass those
aliens who sought judicial review of their removal orders before the Court of Appeals and
are awaiting final decisions. Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 942.
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
50. Id. § 1226(c).
51. Klein & Wittes, supra note 44, at 144.
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1).
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removed within this timeframe must be released on supervision."
However, section 1231(a)(6) authorizes the government to
continually detain beyond the ninety-day removal period certain
aliens ordered deported (i.e., those who are inadmissible or
deportable due to criminal activity)."
Two Supreme Court cases have addressed the second and third
categories of detainable aliens. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court was
asked to determine whether section 1231(a)(6) authorized indefinite
mandatory detention of aliens with final removal orders." Finding
that indefinite detention raises serious constitutional concerns, the
Court construed the statute to allow detention only for the limited
period necessary to effectuate removal.6  The Court held that
detention becomes presumptively prolonged at six months.57 To be
clear, Zadvydas does not guarantee an alien's release after six months
of detention under section 1231(a)(6). An alien will only be released
if he can show there is "no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future."8  The Court's six-month rule
indicates the point in time an alien becomes entitled to a bond
hearing, where he can then demonstrate his eligibility for release.
In Demore v. Kim, 9 the Court was then asked to determine
whether indefinite mandatory detention was authorized under the
pre-removal statute.' The Court stated that mandatory detention
under section 1226(c) serves the purpose of ensuring an alien's
presence during his removal proceedings.6 As such, the Court
affirmed the government's authority to detain aliens without bond
while their removal proceedings are pending.62 Significantly, the
Demore Court repeatedly emphasized its understanding that pre-
removal detention was short and had a definite end point.63 The
Court stated, "the detention at stake under § 1226(c) lasts roughly a
month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which it is invoked,
53. Id. at § 1231(a)(3).
54. Id. at § 1231(a)(6).
55. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 701.
58. Id.
59. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
60. Id. at 515-16.
61. Id. at 521.
62. Id. at 531.
63. Id. at 528-31.
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and about five months in the minority of cases in which the alien
chooses to appeal."64  Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in
Demore-often cited in any discussion involving the reasonableness
of immigration detention-advocates for conducting individualized
custody determination hearings in certain circumstances. He notes
particularly that:
Since the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary
deprivations of liberty, a lawful permanent resident
alien such as respondent could be entitled to an
individualized determination as to his risk of flight and
dangerousness if the continued detention became
unreasonable or unjustified ... Were there to be an
unreasonable delay by the INS in pursuing and
completing deportation proceedings, it could become
necessary then to inquire whether the detention is not
to facilitate deportation, or to protect against risk of
flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other
65reasons.
In Demore, the Court denied Mr. Kim's request for a bond
hearing, finding that his six-month conviction fell within "the brief
period" for removal proceedings.66
Lower courts have struggled to reconcile Zadvydas and Demore
in the context of pre-removal detention. While Zadvydas stated that
post-removal detention becomes prolonged at the six-month mark,6
Demore did not specify the exact point in time when an alien's pre-
removal detention becomes prolonged. It stated that pre-removal
detention lasts anywhere between a month and a half and five
months, but upheld a six-month detention without bond.68 In the
absence of a bright-line rule, courts have had to engage in a case-by-
case analysis to determine whether a particular alien's pre-removal
detention (under section 1225 or section 1226) has become prolonged.
Under this approach, courts consider factors such as length of
detention, estimated length of future proceedings, likelihood of
64. Id. at 530.
65. Id. at 532-33 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 530.
67. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
68. Demore, 538 U.S. at 530.
[Vol. 42:3
Spring 2015] PROLONGED PRE-REMOVAL DETENTION 609
removability, and conduct of both parties.69 Not surprisingly, then,
this approach has yielded varying results.0 The "constitutional grey
area"7' left by Demore has clearly resulted in the detention of aliens
for years during the pendency of their removal proceedings. Part II
of this Note discusses a Ninth Circuit case aimed at remedying this
problem.
II. Rodriguez v. Robbins: The Ninth Circuit Declares an
Automatic Right to a Bond Hearing After Six Months of
Pre-Removal Mandatory Detention
Rodriguez v. Robbins concerned a class of non-citizens in
southern California who have been detained for six months or longer
under two immigration statutes, sections 1226(c) and 1225(b) of Title
8 of the United States Code. As discussed in Part I, aliens detained
under section 1226(c) are not entitled to release on bond, although
they can request a Joseph hearing to challenge the applicability of
section 1226(c) to their case.73 In contrast to those detained under
section 1226(c), aliens detained under 1225(b), such as asylum
seekers, may be released on parole subject to the discretion of ICE
officers.74 The Rodriguez detainees argued that subjecting them to
prolonged mandatory detention under either of these statutes without
affording them bond hearings conducted by a neutral arbiter was
constitutionally infirm.75  The United States District Court for the
69. Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241
(9th Cir. 2005); Leslie v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 678 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2012).
70. See, e.g., Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 942 (bond hearing required after seven-
year detention); Andrade, 459 F.3d at 538 (petition denied despite three-year detention);
Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1241 (alien entitled to release on bail following two years and eight
months of detention); Del Toro-Chacon v. Chertoff, No. C051861RSL, 2008 WL 687445
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2008) (alien not entitled to bond hearing despite two years and five
months of detention); Middleton v. Clark, No. C061324RSM, 2007 WL 1031725 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 2, 2007) (two-year detention was not unreasonable).
71. Kimere Jane Kimball, Note, A Right to be Heard: Non-Citizens' Due Process
Right to In-Person Hearings to Justify Their Detentions Pursuant o Removal, 5 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 159, 162 (2009).
72. Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1131. The class of petitioners is represented by the
ACLU.
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) provides that an alien detained under this statute may only
be released if necessary to protect a third-party. A Joseph hearing provides an alien the
opportunity to challenge the applicability of section 1226(c) to his case. In re Joseph, 22 I
& N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999).
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
75. Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1130.
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Central District of California entered a preliminary injunction
ordering ICE to grant each detainee an individualized bond hearing
before an immigration judge.76 At a bond hearing, an immigration
judge shall grant release on reasonable conditions of supervision
unless the government satisfies its burden of showing that the alien's
continued detention is justified based on his danger to society or
flight risk.77 Upon appeal by the government, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's ruling." The government did not petition
for review before the United States Supreme Court.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion begins with an analysis of the section
1226(c) subclass and its likelihood of prevailing on the merits.9 After
referencing numerous precedents, including Zadvydas and Demore,
the court concluded that mandatory detention under section 1226(c)
is necessarily limited in duration.8" A long line of cases evidences the
fact that the Ninth Circuit, as well as other jurisdictions, have broadly
interpreted Demore to require a time limit to mandatory detention
notwithstanding its holding that aliens detained under section 1226(c)
are not entitled to bond hearings.81
The government insisted that aliens detained under section
1226(c) are not entitled to individualized hearings to determine
whether their continued detention remains justified.82 In support of
76. Id. at 1130-31.
77. The injunction also required the government to identify all class members
detained under each of the two statutes. Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1130-31.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1136-39.
80. Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1138 ("[W]e conclude that, to avoid constitutional
concerns, § 1226(c)'s mandatory language must be construed 'to contain an implicit
"reasonable time" limitation, the application of which is subject to federal-court review."')
(citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682).
81. See, e.g., Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 950 ("References to the brevity of
mandatory detention under § 1226(c) run throughout Demore."); Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1242
(similar); Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006) ("In Demore, the
Court grounded its holding by referencing a 'brief period' . . of 'temporary
confinement'... There is no indication anywhere in Demore that the Court would
countenance an indefinite detention.") (citations omitted); Diop, 656 F.3d at 221 ("At a
certain point, continued detention becomes unreasonable and the Executive Branch's
implementation of § 1226(c) becomes unconstitutional unless the Government has
justified its actions at a hearing inquiring into whether continued detention is consistent
with the law's purposes of preventing flight and dangers to the community."); Ly, 351 F.3d
at 271 ("[T]he Court's discussion in Kim is undergirded by reasoning relying on the fact
that Kim, and persons like him, will normally have their proceedings completed within...
a short period of time and will actually be deported, or will be released. That is not the
case here.").
82. Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1138.
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their argument, the government maintained it was the country's
immigration policy to detain aliens pending their removal
proceedings to prevent flight and danger to society, and that the term
"shall" in the statute is to be construed as permitting mandatory
detention without bond hearings.83 Unconvinced by the government's
efforts to turn the tide, the Rodriguez court simply stated that such a
reading of Demore is at odds with its post-Demore cases.4
The government also attempted to distinguish cases that involved
post-removal detention from the pre-removal detention.85  For
instance, the ruling in Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland
Security required the government to give individualized bond
hearings to detained aliens seeking judicial review of their removal
orders (detention pursuant to section 1226(a)).86 Diouf v. Napolitano
(Diouf 11)87 extended the requirement for bond hearings to detainees
with administrative final removal orders but who have not been
removed within the ninety-day removal period (detention pursuant to
section 1231(a)(6))." The Rodriguez court stated, "this seems to us a
distinction without a difference... Indeed, if anything, because LPRs
[lawful permanent residents] detained prior to the entry of an
administratively final removal order have not been adjudicated
removable, they would seem to have a greater liberty interest than
individuals detained pending judicial review.., and thus a greater
entitlement to a bond hearing.,89 The Rodriguez court's refusal to
distinguish pre-removal detention from post-removal detention is
perhaps the most vital aspect of the court's entire decision because it
allowed it to adopt the rationale from prior cases regarding the issue
of when detention becomes "prolonged."
Zadvydas holds that six months is the presumptively reasonable
limit to post-removal-period detention under section 1231(a)(6).' In
Demore, the Supreme Court had the specific understanding that
section 1226(a) authorized mandatory detention only for the limited
83. Id.
84. Id. ("We are not convinced by the government's reasoning, which relies on a
broad reading of Demore foreclosed by our post-Demore cases.").
85. Id. at 1139.
86. Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 943; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012).
87. Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011).
88. Id. at 1084; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
89. Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1139.
90. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680 ("It is unlikely that Congress believed that all
reasonably foreseeable removals could be accomplished in 90 days, but there is reason to
believe that it doubted the constitutionality of more than six months' detention.").
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period of the alien's removal proceedings, which the Court estimated
"lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in
which it is invoked, and about five months in the minority of cases in
which the alien chooses to appeal."91 In Diouf II, the Ninth Circuit
suggested that detention under section 1226(a) becomes prolonged at
the 180-day mark, after which time an alien must be given a bond
hearing unless removal is imminent.' Consistent with the reasoning
of these cases, the Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez arrived at the
conclusion that aliens detained under sections 1226(c) and 1225(b)
are entitled to bond hearings when their detention becomes
prolonged at six months.93
The government presented two arguments against a six-month
rule.94 First, the government urged that a categorical time limit is
contrary to the decisions of other circuits, particularly the Sixth and
Third Circuits.95 In Ly v. Hansen and Diop v. ICE, the Sixth and
Third Circuits rejected a bright-line time limit on pre-removal
detention without a bond hearing.96 The Rodriguez court, however,
explained why the reasoning in Ly and Diop could not apply to
Rodriguez.97 The Ninth Circuit noted that Rodriguez was a class
action suit, and therefore relief would have had to apply to all aliens
detained under sections 1226(c) and 1225(b) in the district.98 Also,
the court of appeals indicated there was no reason to depart from the
holding in Diouf H that continued detention is presumed prolonged
when it exceeds six months.99
The government's second argument against what it termed a
"six-month blanket rule" was that such a rule "embrace[s] an
inflexible blanket approach to due process analysis."'° The Court
stated that this was not the case because the six-month rule merely
identified the point in time during an alien's detention that he
91. Demore, 538 U.S. at 530.
92. Diouf 11, 634 F.3d at 1091-92.
93. Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1139 ("Even if Diouf II does not squarely hold that
detention always becomes prolonged at six months, that conclusion is consistent with the
reasoning of Zadvydas, Demore, Casas[-Castrillon] and Diouf II, and we so hold.").
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Ly, 351 F.3d at 271; Diop, 656 F.3d at 234.
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becomes entitled to a bond hearing.1  It is during these bond
hearings that individualized determinations will be made as to
whether a particular alien's continued detention is justified."v
The opinion then proceeded with its analysis of the section
1225(b) subclass.' The government asserted that the "entry fiction"
doctrine"' precluded the court of appeals from granting the same due
process rights to the section 1225(b) subclass as would apply to
section 1226(c) detainees.105 The court of appeals acknowledged that
the "entry fiction" doctrine does apply to majority of the aliens
detained under section 1225(b).16 The court of appeals, however,
recognized that section 1225(b) also applies to some lawful
permanent residents returning from abroad after a brief period of
time, who for some reason, have been rendered inadmissible.", The
court of appeals stated that these aliens are entitled to the same due
process rights as other detainees." Because some aliens in the
1225(b) subclass were entitled to the same due process rights as other
classes of immigrants, the Ninth Circuit declined to exclude 1225(b)
detainees from its holding in order to protect the constitutional rights
of those aliens to whom the "entry fiction" doctrine does not apply."
Thus, under the Rodriguez opinion, all aliens detained under section
1225(b) are entitled to an opportunity to argue for their release after
six months of detention.
Following the ruling from the Ninth Circuit, the class of
detainees filed a motion for summary judgment in district court
requesting four additional procedural safeguards."' First, the
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1139-44.
104. Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir. 1995) (The entry fiction
doctrine refers to the view that arriving aliens enjoy less constitutional protections than
other detained aliens because they have not been granted admission to the United States).
105. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Barrera-
Echavarria, 44 F.3d at 1441.
106. Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1140.
107. Lawful permanent residents who engaged in illegal activity after having left the
United States for a brief period of time are treated as aliens seeking admission and are
included in the 1225(b) subclass. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(iii) (2012).
108. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21,103 (1982) (holding that a lawful permanent
resident arrested for alien smuggling upon return to the United States is entitled to due
process).
109. Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1142-43.
110. Rodriguez v. Holder, No. CV-3239 TJH (RNBx), 2013 WL 5229795 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 6,2013).
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petitioners requested that their likelihood of removal be considered
at their bond hearing."' The district court denied this request,
explaining that considering the likelihood of removal as a factor at a
bond hearing expands the scope and purpose of a bond hearing.1
2
Second, the petitioners requested that an immigration judge "be
required to consider conditions short of incarceration." The district
court stated that immigration judges should already be considering
alternatives to incarceration such as, house arrest with electronic
monitoring"' Third, the petitioners requested that they
automatically receive bond hearings, rather than being required to
request a hearing."4 The district court granted this request stating,
"[t]he bond hearing process would be fraught with peril if the court of
appeals were to place the burden on detainees to request a bond
hearing when the government is constitutionally obligated to provide
those hearings.""' 5 Finally, the petitioners requested that their
hearing notices be written in plain language."6 The district court also
granted this request stating, "comprehensible notice must be
provided to detainees for that notice to pass constitutional review.""..7
The Rodriguez decision is expected to make waves across the
Ninth Circuit."8  Following the decision, courts have either
automatically granted habeas petitions or asked that the parties
provide further briefing in light of the Rodriguez decision.9 As of
March 2014, the six-month rule has been adopted by only one court
from another jurisdiction.'







118. Rodriguez, et al. v. Robbins, et al., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
(December 8, 2014), available at https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/rodriguez-et-al-v-
robbins-et-al ("The ruling stands to benefit thousands of immigration detainees across the
Ninth Circuit, where an estimated 25% of immigrant detainees are held every year.").
119. Khoury v. Asher, No. C13-1367RAJ, 2014 WL 954920 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11,
2014); Shahzad v. Gurule, No. CV13-1176-PHX-DGC (MEA), 2014 WL 690924 (D. Ariz.
Feb. 24, 2014); Manzanarez v. Holder, Civ. No. 13-00354-SOM/BMK, 2013 WL 5607167
(D. Haw. Oct. 11, 2013); Jumapili v. Ice Field Office Dir., No. C13-1026-RSL, 2013 WL
5719805 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 21, 2013).
120. Reid v. Donelan, C.A. No. 13-cv-30125-MAP, 2014 WL 105026 (D. Mass. Jan. 9,
2014).
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III. Contrasting Approaches and How Due Process Favors the
Six-Month Rule
Zadvydas, Demore, and myriad cases that have applied them in
different jurisdictions clearly mandate that a "reasonable time
limitation" must be read into the pre-removal mandatory immigration
detention statutes.12  Indeed, even without the Supreme Court's
direction in Zadvydas, the Fifth Amendment certainly requires the
same prohibition on indefinite civil detentionY" However, as seen in
Rodriguez, the government still tries to persuade courts that the pre-
removal detention statute authorizes indefinite detention without
bond hearings. Courts have moved beyond this threshold question
and into the inquiry of what constitutes a "prolonged" detention
period. 3  A recent district court opinion describes the two
approaches that have emerged:
The thornier aspect . . . lies in the definition of
"reasonableness." Two approaches have emerged.
One view, adopted by the Third and Sixth Circuits,
requires a "fact-dependent inquiry requiring an
assessment of all of the circumstances of any given
case," to determine whether detention without an
individualized hearing is unreasonable... The other
approach, one employed by the Ninth Circuit, applies
a bright-line rule. Under that view, the government's
"statutory mandatory detention authority under
Section 1226(c) . .. [is] limited to a six-month period,
subject to a finding of flight risk or dangerousness.""'2
As discussed below, the Ninth Circuit's six-month approach, and
not the Third and Sixth Circuit's case-by-case approach, should be the
121. See Gerald Siepp & Sophie Feal, The Mandatory Detention Dilemma: The Role of
the Federal Courts in Tempering the Scope of INA § 236(c), 10-07 IMMIGRATION
BRIEFINGS 1 (2010).
122. The Due Process Clause forbids the government from depriving a person of his
or her "liberty ... without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
123. See generally Sengkeo v. Horgan, 670 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D. Mass. 2009) (whether
twenty months of pre-removal detention is reasonable); Johnson v. Orsino, 942 F. Supp.
2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (whether fifteen-month pre-removal detention without a bond
hearing was unreasonably long); Hernandez v. Sabol, 823 F. Supp. 2d 266 (M.D. Pa. 2011)
(whether seven-month pre-removal detention without a bond hearing was reasonable).
124. Reid, C.A. No. 13-cv-30125-MAP, 2014 WL 105026, at *3 (emphasis added).
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rule across all jurisdictions. Due process considerations and
administrative efficiency influence this conclusion.
A. The Third and Sixth Circuit's Case-By-Case Approach
Challenges to pre-removal mandatory detention without bond
hearings are traditionally made through habeas petitions where
district court judges engage in a case-by-case analysis to determine
whether an alien's detention has become "prolonged." The Third
and Sixth Circuits recognize the possibility of changing the traditional
approach, but have expressly decided against a bright-line rule.
In Diop v. ICE, the Third Circuit refused to adopt the
presumption in Zadvydas that detention beyond six months was
unreasonable.'25 The court stated:
Reasonableness, by its very nature, is a fact-dependent
inquiry requiring an assessment of all of the
circumstances of any given case. That being said, we
note that the reasonableness of any given detention
pursuant to § 1226(c) is a function of whether it is
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the statute.
126
The Sixth Circuit in Ly v. Hansen expressed a similar position:
A bright-line time limitation, as imposed in Zadvydas,
would not be appropriate for the pre-removal period;
hearing schedules and other proceedings must have
leeway for expansion or contraction as the necessities
of the case and the immigration judge's caseload
warrant. In the absence of a set period of time, courts
must examine the facts of each case, to determine
whether there has been unreasonable delay in
concluding removal proceedings12
As explained by Diop and Ly, the "fact-dependent inquiry" is
the preferable approach for the pre-removal context because it takes
into account individual circumstances as well as the court's caseload.
Further, given that cases of pre-removal detention exceeding six
125. Diop, 656 F.3d at 234.
126. Id.
127. Ly, 351 F.3d at 271-73.
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months are rare,128 any special circumstances of these cases should
determine whether a bond hearing is warranted.29 In making such a
determination, the district courts hearing habeas petitions consider
the same factors immigration judges consider at bond hearings.
These include: (a) the length of detention; (b) the foreseeability of
actual removal; and (c) the conduct of both the immigration
authorities and the detainee."
The government has additional reasons for advocating for the
case-by-case approach and against the Ninth Circuit's six-month rule.
The government in Rodriguez raised some of the key reasons. First,
the six-month rule supposedly places a great burden on the
government since it would be required to defend against multiple
bond hearings potentially around the same time.3' The government
might also be unable to prepare for bond hearings in time. This
difficulty on the part of the government could potentially result in the
release of a large number of non-citizens. Finally, the government
argues that the six-month rule would place a burden on the
administrative resources because courts will be required to provide
hundreds of bond hearings.'33
Indeed, even after Rodriguez, the traditional case-by-case
approach continues to be the framework for challenges to
immigration detention in other jurisdictions."
B. The Ninth Circuit's Six-Month Rule
As discussed in Part II, the Ninth Circuit believes that the six-
month approach is consistent with prior Supreme Court cases. Under
this approach, aliens who have been detained for more than six
months pending removal proceedings will automatically be entitled to
128. Demore, 538 U.S. at 529 ("The Executive Office for Immigration Review has
calculated that, in 85% of the cases in which aliens are detained pursuant to § 1226(c),
removal proceedings are completed in an average time of 47 days and a median of 30 days.
Brief for Petitioners 39-40. In the remaining 15% of cases, in which the alien appeals the
decision of the Immigration Judge to the Board of Immigration Appeals, appeal takes an
average of four months, with a median time that is slightly shorter.").
129. Ramirez, No. B:10-126, 2010 WL 6269226, at *52.
130. Ly, 351 F.3d at 271-72.
131. Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1145.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Stephens v. Aviles, No. 13-4295 (FSH), 2013 WL 4537985 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2013);
Ricketts v. Holder, No. 13-0308, 2013 WL 3087236 (D.N.J. Jun. 12, 2013); Barcelona v.
Napolitano, No. 12-7494 (SRC), 2013 WL 6188478 (D.N.J. Nov. 26,2013).
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bond hearings. The six-month rule provides a more efficient
framework for avoiding due process violations in the immigration
detention context. Additionally, the rule favors administrative
concerns.
1. The Six-Month Rule Best Protects Aliens' Due Process Rights
First, there is a substantial risk of deprivation of due process
rights when detention exceeds six months.13 "Indeed, no persuasive
argument justifies discarding this pragmatic approach when dealing
with individuals detained under section 1226(c).'' 136  Thus, it is
reasonable to entitle detainees to bond hearings before an
immigration judge at this stage of the proceedings.
Second, the simplicity of the six-month approach provides more
certainty and avoids the incongruence that could flow from a case-by-
case approach. District court judges applying the case-by-case
approach may interpret similar facts in different ways, leading to
disparate results. For instance, some judges have taken the position
that good faith applications for relief or appeals do not justify denying
a request for a bond hearing, while others have held that requests to
continue removal proceedings due to pending applications or appeals
can make a prolonged detention period reasonable.137  As a result,
courts have held that a twenty-month detention was unreasonably
prolonged even though the delay was attributable to the alien's two
appeals,'138 while also having held that a fifteen-month detention of an
alien whose appeal had been pending for four months was not
unreasonably prolonged.'39
Not only have courts taken varying approaches with respect to
appeals by the alien, but they have also taken different positions with
regard to appeals by the DHS. 4° Some judges have taken the position
that delays due to government appeals weigh heavily against the
respondents in determining whether detention has become
135. Demore, 538 U.S. at 530.
136. Reid, No. 13-cv-30125-MAP, 2014 WL 105026, at *4.
137. Farrin Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immigration
Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 397-98 (2014) (citations omitted).
138. Gupta v. Sabol, No. 1:11-1081, 2011 WL 3897964 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2011) (finding
a twenty-month detention unreasonably long even though the detention was caused by the
detainee's two appeals).
139. Johnson v. Orsino, 942 F. Supp. 2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying Third and Sixth
Circuit approaches and deeming a fifteen-month detention not unreasonably prolonged
because individual's appeal had been pending for four months).
140. Anello, supra note 137, at 398 (citations omitted).
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unreasonably prolonged.' On the other hand, some judges have held
that continued detention beyond six months for the purpose of
allowing the government to pursue an appeal does not render an
alien's detention unreasonably prolonged when the government's
decision to appeal is found to be reasonable or the appeal is
conducted at a permissible pace. '
Disparities also arise from the fact that some courts hearing
habeas petitions consider factors that others have deemed
irrelevant.'43 These factors include the expected duration of future
detention and the likelihood of success in removal proceedings.'"
Under the rule, aliens who have been detained beyond six months
will automatically be entitled to bond hearings. This ensures that a
detainee who is eligible for release, would not have to remain
detained any longer than is necessary. In response to criticisms that
the bright-line rule fails to account for individual circumstances that
should affect the outcome of each case, the six-month rule does not
foreclose an opportunity for individualized assessment because uch
an assessment will be made at the detainee's bond hearing before an
immigration judge.
Third, proponents of the six-month approach assert that the rule
ensures due process would be afforded to all detainees whose
confinement goes beyond six months.'45 Prior to the Ninth Circuit's
six-month rule, detainees wanting to challenge their prolonged
detention would have to file habeas petitions with the district court.
The district court will then determine whether the detainee is entitled
to either release or a bond hearing. The individualized approach,
however, "presumes that detainees have knowledge about the
American court system and have finances to obtain an attorney (or
are fortunate enough to receive pro bono assistance) and that they
have the language skills required to navigate the legal thicket.'
16
141. Tkochenko v. Sabol, 792 F. Supp. 2d 733,741 (M.D. Pa. 2011); Akinola v. Weber,
No. 09-3415, 2010 WL 376603, at *5 (D.N.J. 2010); Victor v. Mukasey, No. 3:CV-08-1914,
2008 WL 5061810 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
142. Jayasekara v. Warden, No. 1:10-1649, 2011 WL 31346, at *5 (M.D. Pa. 2011)
(finding similarly that petitioner's request for continuance was not unreasonable, and
denying a bond hearing on the theory that future detention was unlikely to be prolonged);
Segura v. Holder, No. 4:CV-10-2045, 2010 WL 5356499, at *2 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
143. Anello, supra note 137, at 400.
144. Id. at 399-400 (citations omitted).
145. Reid, No. 13-cv-30125, 2014 WL 105026, at *5.
146. Id.
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The six-month approach eliminates the need for filing habeas
petitions, and simply requires the court to schedule a bond hearing
for someone who has been detained for over six months. Aliens
would be given an opportunity to speak directly to an immigration
judge regarding their request for release on reasonable bond.'47 Thus,
under the six-month approach, unrepresented detainees who lack
knowledge of the legal process will not be unjustly deprived of due
process.
2. Administrative Concerns Favor a Six-Month Rule
By eliminating the need for two hearings, the six-month rule
eases the burden on both the government and the detainee.48 The
benefit of the rule to detainees has been discussed above.
Adjudicating challenges to pre-removal mandatory detention
solely before the immigration courts is more efficient for the
government.'49 Habeas petitions are lengthy and require extensive
written and oral argument. In contrast, immigration judges can
quickly adjudicate detention-related issues, sometimes even during
the same day as a preliminary removal hearing.
Also, the six-month rule reduces the instances of habeas
petitions, thereby allowing the government to redirect its attention to
the goal of quickly resolving pending removal cases. Currently, about
fifteen percent of pre-removal detention cases go beyond six
months.5° If the government can resolve removal proceedings prior
to the end of six months, the government will further reduce the need
for Rodriguez bond hearings.
Finally, the government should weigh the cost of providing bond
hearings against the cost of unnecessarily housing hundreds or
thousands of aliens. In fiscal year 2013, $2 billion were allocated for
detention, funding as many as 34,000 detention beds each day.'
For the reasons stated above, due process and administrative
considerations favor the six-month rule. However, as the next section
illustrates, a combination of the two approaches might be best.
147. Anello, supra note 137, at 399.
148. Reid, No. 13-cv-30125, 2014 WL 105026, at *15.
149. Anello, supra note 137, at 401.
150. Demore, 538 U.S. at 529.
151. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2013, H.R. Rep. No. 112-
492, at 50 (2012).
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IV. Proposed Solution: Combined Case-by-Case Approach and
Six-Month Approach
Whether the courts adopt the Ninth Circuit's six-month rule or
the Third and Sixth Circuit's case-by-case approach, an alien would
have to be detained for at least six months in order to determine
whether his detention is reasonable. Either approach presumes that
an alien's detention for the first six months is reasonable and justified.
However, there may be situations where an alien's detention for any
period of time might not be reasonable. For instance, an alien who is
neither a flight risk or danger to society should not be detained at all
even if he is to receive a bond hearing at a later date. Indeed, neither
approach can prevent a constitutional violation, it can only remedy
it.52 "To assume that DHS will only detain those immigrants whom it
reasonably thinks it can remove within a reasonable amount of time is
to grant DHS an undeserved omniscience.'
153
In order to balance the interests of both the detainees and the
government, the two approaches described above should be
combined. The proposal involves giving aliens a hearing at the outset
of litigation to determine whether the detainee may be entitled to a
bond hearing at that time, rather than waiting for six months. This
approach is based on Judge Tashima's concurring opinion in the
Ninth Circuit case, Tijani v. Willis:
[The government] should interpret § 236(c) to apply
mandatory detention in a more narrow fashion. Only
those immigrants who could not raise a "substantial"
argument against their removability should be subject
to mandatory detention...
The 'substantial argument' standard strikes the best
balance between an alien's liberty interest and the
government's interest in regulating immigration ... It
gives the alien's liberty rights adequate respect and
ensures that the alien's detention will be relatively
brief. At the same time, it provides the government
leeway to detain those aliens who lack any incentive to
152. Bradley Banias, A "Substantial Argument" Against Prolonged, Pre-Removal
Mandatory Detention, 11 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 31, 56 (2009).
153. Id.
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press their legal claims, and are therefore the most
likely to abandon those claims and flee.54
Similar to a Rodriguez hearing, an alien who prevails at this
initial hearing only receives a bond hearing, not release."5 An alien
will only be released upon a showing that he is not a danger to society
or a flight risk.56 Unlike a Rodriguez hearing, however, an alien will
have the opportunity to demonstrate he is entitled to a bond hearing
without waiting for six months.
If the alien does not prevail at this initial hearing, or if the
government chooses to appeal, he may have to wait six months before
receiving a bond hearing. This possibility of further detention is
where the safety-net feature of this approach comes into play. '57 The
six-month rule serves to ensure that all aliens detained pending their
removal proceedings receive a bond hearing after they have been
detained for six months.
Finally, this two-step approach, which combines a case-by-case
inquiry at the outset of litigation with a six-month rule as a safety net
feature, is best for both detainees and the government for two
primary reasons. First, this approach is administratively efficient
because it eliminates the need for habeas petitions. Second, and
more importantly, the approach helps avoid due process violations
instead of trying to remedy violations after they have occurred. The
approach meets the government's interest in detaining only those
who are true flight risks or those who have no legitimate grounds for
challenging removability.59
Conclusion
Prolonged mandatory detention has long been an issue in the
pre-removal context. The absence of a bright-line rule for what
constitutes a reasonable length of detention has resulted in the
detention of thousands of aliens for years. Many aliens fall through
the cracks due to the backlog of cases at immigration courts; many
face severe hardship in filing habeas petitions; and many find
themselves on the losing end of a system that has created disparate
154. Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1247.
155. Banias, supra note 152, at 69.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 68.
159. Id.
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results. The rule introduced by the Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez, where
aliens automatically receive bond hearings after six-months of
detention, seeks to remedy these problems.'60 However, not only is
the Ninth Circuit's approach rejected by other jurisdictions,6 it might
still be inadequate to protect the due process rights of aliens. Under
either the Ninth Circuit's six-month rule or the traditional case-by-
case approach, an alien is guaranteed to be detained for at least six-
months. In cases where an alien poses no flight risk or danger to the
community, such detention, even for a period of six months, may be
unreasonable. A better approach is to conduct a case-by-case inquiry
at the outset of removal proceedings to determine whether an alien
may be entitled to a bond hearing, and, upon the decision to detain
him, to automatically give him a second bond hearing after six months
of detention. This approach, while ensuring that aliens will not be
unreasonably detained, may be burdensome on immigration courts
and may be costly. A cost-benefit analysis is necessary to weigh the
burden and costs of such an approach against the burden and costs of
the current system. At this time, however, should the Supreme Court
have to rule on a jurisdictional split, the Ninth Circuit's six-month
rule better protects the due process rights of aliens and should be
adopted.
160. See Michael Tan, Victory: Federal Courts Immigration Detainees Deserve Fair
Hearings, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 7, 2013), available at
https://www.aclu.orgfblog/immigrants-rights/victory-federal-court-ruies-immigration-detai
nees-deserve-fair-hearings.
161. See Diop, 656 F.3d at 234; Ly, 351 F.3d at 271-73.
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T his collection of essays, speeches and ruminations spans 25 years of
Daniel's Schorr's remarkable half-century career. He is in a unique position- from
decades of covering the most influential stories of our lifetime - to provide insight in the
evolution of modem American journalism as well as a rare look at himself, the man behind
the news story, one of modem journalism's founding fathers.
Vietnam and Watergate, the Cold War, national and international politics - literally the
biggest stories of our times - has been Daniel Schorr's "beat." Forgive Us Our Press
Passes contains Daniel Schorr's reflections on the role of media in society, the effects of
television on the development of the journalistic craft, privacy and secrecy, the First
Amendment, and government suppression of information.
To order, please send this form to:
O'Brien Center for Scholarly Publications
University of California
Hastings College of the Law
200 McAllister Street




Paperbound, US$14.95 Quantity: Total:
Enclosed is my check in the amount of $
(Must be US funds drawn on a US Bank)
For credit card orders, https://mercury.uchastings.edu/secured/pubs-commerce/cgi-bin/
commerce.cgi?listcategories
Visa, MasterCard, American Express and Discover
A publication of the Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal (COMM/ENT).





ECOGNITION OFTHE IMPORTANCE OFTHE RELA
TIONSHIP BETWEEN SCIENCEAND TECHNOLOGY
1 ' THELAW, AND THEBENEFITS TO BE DERIVED
FROM EXPLORINGTHE DEVELOPMENT OF THISAREA OF
LAW, has prompted the genesis of the Hastings Science &
Technology Law Journal. Among the diverse subjects to which
the Journal will address itself are the legal issues concerning
science, scientific methodology technology, biotechnology, bio-
ethics, patents, trade secrets, and health.
Our goal is twofold: first, to provide legal practitioners, judges,
policy makers, scientists and engineers with intellectually stimu-
lating and scholarly material concerning current issues in the
field; and second, to introduce students to the array of unique
issues presented in the nexus of law, science and technology.
WE INVITE SUBSCRIPTIONSAND SUBMISSIONS OFARTICLES,
COMMENTARIES, ANDPAPERS.
Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal
UC Hastings College of the Law
200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102-4978
stlj@uchastings.edu
Subscription price: $45.00 per year (US $55.00 foreign)
Single issue price: $35.00 each (US $40.00 foreign)
SELECTED WRITINGS OF
ROGER J. TRAYNOR
Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court was
acclaimed by scholars everywhere as eminently deserving the Ameri-
can Bar Association's gold medal award, which described him as "one
of the great judges in United States history." Justice Traynor left a
legacy of papers and memorabilia to Hastings College of the Law as a
nucleus for new scholarship, and the first public collection of Traynor
material opened at Hastings in October 1987.
A great teacher as well as a great jurist, Justice Traynor wrote a
number of essays on law and the judicial process. Hastings Law Jour-
nal takes pride in presenting this special collection of Traynor writings.
Five hundred numbered hardbound copies of this sampling of
Traynor writings are available, as well as softbound copies. To order
your copies please mail the following form to:
O'Brien Center for Scholarly Publications
Hastings College of the Law
200 McAllister Street






Number of copies requested:
Numbered hardbound --- at $30.00 each
Softbound --- at $18.00 each
Enclosed is my check in the amount of $-- -
Hastings College of the Law:
The First Century
1878-1978
by Thomas Garden Barnes
This centennial celebration
of Hastings College of the
Law, published in 1978 at the
100th anniversary of the col-
lege, tracing the development
of an extraordinary institut-
tion, born in pre-Gold Rush
San Francisco,. It is the story
of a maverick law school and
of the distinctive personalities
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Hastings West-Northwest Journal of
Environmental Law and Policy's
ANTHOLOGY
THE VERY BEST IN ENVIRONENTAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP FROM
WEST-NORTHWEST
VOLUME 1 THROUGH VOLUME 13
INCLUDING:
Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and the Privatization of Water, article
by Joseph Sax
Natural Community Conservation Planning: A Targeted Approach to Endangered
Species Conservation, article by Steve Johnson
The Federal Role in Managing the Nation's Groundwater, artcile by John D. Leshy
The Shape of Things to Come: A Model Water Transfer Act for California, article by
Brian E. Gray
Water Markets and the Cost of Improving Water Quality in the San Francisco Bay/
Delta Estuary, article by David Sunding, David Zilbermann, and Neal
MacDougall
Global Climate Change: Water Supply Risks and Water Management Opportunities,
article by Brian E. Gray
Climate Change and the Law of the River- A Southern Nevada Perspective, article by
Patricia Mulroy
TO ORDER A COPY OF WEST-NORTHWEST'S "GREATEST HITS"
AT THE SPECIAL, LIMITED-TIME-ONLY PRICE OF $15.00
PLEASE SEND YOUR NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS TO
SCHOLARP@UCHASTINGS.EDU
Hastings West-Northwest Journal of
Environmental Law and Policy
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
From WNW Volume 13, Number 1:
In the Heat of the Law, It's Not Just Steam: Geothermal Resources
and the Impacts on Thermophile Biodiveristy
- Donald 1. Kochan and Tiffany Grant
From WNW Volume 12, Number 1:
Coast Salish Property Law: An Alternative Paradigm for
Environmental Relationships
- Russel Lawrence Barsh
From WNW Volume 11, Number 2:
The Plain "Dam!" Language of Fish & Game Code Section 5937:
How California's Clearest Statute Has Been Diverted From Its
Legislative Mandate - Robert Firpo
From WNW Volume 11, Number 1:
The Federal Role in Managing the Nation's Groundwater
-John D. Leshy
From WNW Volume 10, Number 2:
Dividing the Waters: The California Experience - Brian E. Gray
A Brief Examination of the History of the Persistent Debate About
Limits to Western Growth - Dan Tarlock
Subscription Rates
Two issues per year - US funds only
Annual: $45 Domestic
$55 Foreign
Single issue: $35, U.S.; $40 Foreign
Article copy: $35, U.S.; $40 Foreign
Hastings West-Northwest Journal
of Environmental Law and Policy
University of California
Hastings College of the Low
200 McAllister Sheet
Son Francisco, CA 94102
Telephone: 415-581-8966
FAX: 415-581-8976
http://www.uchostings.edu/wnw/index.html
email: wnw@uchnstings.edu
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